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A B S T R A C T
This paper analyzes the eﬀect of incentive-compatible self-chosen goals on academic perfor-
mance by means of a randomized ﬁeld experiment. We use two alternative payment mechanisms,
a piece-rate and a rank-order tournament, to motivate students depending on their absolute or
relative academic performance respectively. Students enrolled in Introductory Microeconomics
were classiﬁed in two types depending on whether they had a failed background in this course
(returning students) or they had not (new students). Controlling for potential confounding factors
such as gender, degree, professor and university entrance grade, we ﬁnd that both payment
mechanisms are eﬀective increasing grades of new and returning students.
1. Motivation
Many students are especially prone to focus too much on the present. Assessing the present costs of studying is much easier than
evaluating (distant) potential future beneﬁts. Policy makers might see this myopic behavior as an opportunity of improvement, and
might want to try to oﬀset present costs implementing closer beneﬁts. One approach to address the present bias is simply requiring
students to think about their academic goals and to formulate them. Another approach to correct the aforementioned bias is oﬀering
immediate incentives that trim immediate costs. Adopting both approaches, we conduct a randomized ﬁeld experiment where over
170 undergraduate students are asked to report their individual goals on academic performance and monetary incentives are de-
livered to participants who reach their self-chosen goal.
2. Literature review
Our paper is related to two separate lines of research. The ﬁrst one is the literature on goal setting. Goal setting is a cognitive
theory based on the premise that the source of motivation is the desire and intention to reach a goal, i.e. the aim of a task that a
person consciously desires to achieve or obtain (Locke and Latham, 2002; Locke and Latham, 2006). In achievement environments,
such as higher education, task goal setting is a function of many variables, including skills and outcome expectations. Following
Zimmerman (2011), outcome expectation can be deﬁned as a belief about the success of a given task, diﬀerentiating it from the
highly correlated concept of self-eﬃcacy expectation, which is the belief about the personal capability to execute the behavior needed
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iree.2018.02.002
Received 5 September 2017; Received in revised form 21 November 2017; Accepted 26 February 2018
☆ This work has been supported by the Ministerio de Economtria, Industria y Competitividad [grant ECO2015-68469-R]; and by the Ministerio de Educación,
Cultura y Deporte [FPU014/02966] of the Spanish government
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: nherranz@uji.es (N. Herranz-Zarzoso), sabater@uji.es (G. Sabater-Grande).
International Review of Economics Education 27 (2018) 34–44
Available online 27 February 2018
1477-3880/ © 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).
T
to produce the desired outcome. Both of them are key for students’ motivation: if a student does not consider himself capable or has
low outcome expectations, his motivation decreases and he does not make the eﬀort needed to succeed.1 Although Bandura (2006)
developed a guide for constructing scales to measure perceived academic self-eﬃcacy, it is not possible to get an incentive-compatible
elicitation of self-eﬃcacy scales. However, outcome expectations can be elicited using betting on outcomes as an incentive-com-
patible method. Speciﬁcally, when students bet on their outcome in a particular task, they take responsibility and ownership for their
own goal. As Elliot and Fryer (2008) pointed out, such self-chosen goal setting is empowering and proactive, creating commitment
and acceptance. In the same vein, Royer et al. (2015) and Samek (2016) concluded that giving the option to subjects to choose their
own goal “acts as an internal commitment device meant to overcome problems of self-control” (Samek 2016, 2).
From the pioneering work of Latham and Locke (1979) to the present, there has been an extensive body of empirical literature
testing goal-setting theory in controlled environments.2,3 However, when it comes to self-chosen goals, the number of empirical
contributions is limited and not all of them use incentive compatibility. Without ﬁnancial incentives, Falk and Knell (2004) presented
a social comparison model where people choose their own reference standards in order to accomplish goals of self-enhancement and
self-improvement. The model’s prediction about people tending to compare themselves to similar others was conﬁrmed through a
questionnaire where students only received a small show-up fee. Using the same methodology, Sackett et al. (2014) presented a
questionnaire where marathoners were either asked or not asked to provide a time goal prior to their race. They found that the mere
fact of asking runners (without potential ﬁnancial reward) about their goals prior to the race improved performance among ex-
perienced but not novice marathoners.
Using a large sample of college students, Clark et al. (2016) analyzed the eﬀect of self-chosen goals based on course performance
and a speciﬁc task (completing online practice exams). They found that course goals had no signiﬁcant impact on the performance of
college students but, in contrast, task-based goals had a large positive eﬀect on the level of task completion. However, students’
extrinsic motivation in these two ﬁeld experiments could be critically undermined because students were not ﬁnancially rewarded
when they met their self-chosen goals. The importance of ﬁnancial incentives was analyzed in Goerg and Kube (2012). By means of a
natural ﬁeld experiment where workers were hired to re-organize a library, these authors presented the workers with an incentives’
contract that combined self-chosen goals and monetary rewards in such a way that all of them preferred to set themselves a non-
trivial goal. They found that self-imposed goals could work even in the absence of corresponding monetary incentives.
Empirical evidence on self-chosen goals where subjects’ performance is based on ﬁnancial incentives is even scarcer. Using a ﬁeld
experiment in an Indian data-entry ﬁrm, Kaur et al. (2010) tested whether workers demand self-disciplining devices. They found that
a fraction of workers voluntarily agreed to incur in a monetary loss when falling short of a self-chosen production goal. Moreover,
Dalton et al. (2015) proposed a simple model of self-chosen goals and tested its predictions in the laboratory, ﬁnding that only men
conﬁrmed their model’s predictions: they exerted greater eﬀort under the self-chosen goal contract system than under a piece-rate
contract.
More related to our experiment and involving ﬁrst-year university students, van Lent and Souverijn (2016) analyzed the eﬀect of
setting a goal and increasing its ambitiousness using mentor-student meetings. They found out that treatment group students per-
formed better as compared to students in the control group. Nevertheless, students who were challenged to set a higher goal per-
formed signiﬁcantly worse than comparable students in the goal treatment. Contrary to van Lent and Souverijn (2016), we ask
students to formulate their own goal and bet on it without any external inﬂuence, rewarding them ﬁnancially. Theoretically, in our
experiment, students’ self-chosen goals must generate more eﬀective incentives than those given by a third party because students set
their goals based on their capabilities and knowledge, creating their own individual motivation.
Second, our paper is related to the literature based on ﬁnancial incentives on academic performance. Experimental economists are
convinced that higher incentives will lead to more eﬀort and higher performance. However, psychologists claim that incentives
improve performance in “algorithmic” or repetitive tasks, but they are less eﬀective, or even counterproductive, in “heuristic” tasks
requiring creativity, concentration, or intuition. Because learning has generally been classiﬁed as heuristic, extrinsic grade incentives
may not be eﬀective motivators. The argument behind this claim is that the use of incentives could crowd out intrinsic motivations
that are important to produce the desired behavior.4 Leaving aside ethical issues about the convenience of using ﬁnancial incentives
to improve students’ grades, incentives have become object of interest of economists, policymakers, and researchers in the last years.
In the literature, mixed evidence has been obtained using randomized ﬁeld experiments and natural experiments (using databases
from state programs) to analyze the eﬀects of ﬁnancial incentives on students’ academic performance.5
3. Research design
All the evidence analyzed in the previous section is far from being conclusive because it has been generated in experiments or
quasi-experiments with a wide array of incentive speciﬁcations, incentivized performances, target students and timing of perfor-
mances and payments. The following is an elaboration of how such characteristics are related to the eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial
incentives on academic performance, comparing our study to the literature.
1 See Pajares (2008) for a literature review on self-eﬃcacy and regulation learning.
2 These authors were the ﬁrst to report evidence that goals lead to a better performance as compared to not setting goals.
3 See Dykstra (2015) for a review on empirical evidence supporting goal setting as a tool to increase individuals’ performance.
4 Gneezy et al. (2011) state that a potential conﬂict arises between the extrinsic and the intrinsic eﬀects of the incentives, especially in areas like education,
contributions to public goods and forming habits, in the short run and in the long run.
5 See Lavecchia et al. (2014) for a survey of eﬀectiveness of ﬁnancial incentives in education.
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To begin with, we deal with the speciﬁcation of the incentives provided. This speciﬁcation includes two general categories:
incentives for inputs and incentives for outputs. The former means anything (reading books, doing homework, attending school, etc.)
that can contribute to learning under the student’s control. The latter refers to student achievement, generally measured through test
scores or class grades. Although Fryer (2011) concluded that output experiments demonstrated less-promising results than the input
ones, we focus on output incentives given that traditional price theory predicts that they are socially optimal.6 Output incentives
include ﬁnancial aid intended for payment of education expenses like tuition, fees and books, and freely available monetary rewards.7
We prefer to use money as incentive because, as Croson (2005) pointed out, everyone values it and it is non-satiable (more is always
better). Additionally, it is worth to note that our ﬁeld experiment has been speciﬁcally designed for research purposes and it is not
part of any state program dedicated to improve academic results. This fact allows us to manipulate independent variables, choosing
timing incentives and payment mechanisms (piece-rate system and rank-order tournament) under controlled conditions.8
Second, we focus on the incentivized performance. In most cases, achievements required are referred to accomplishing a
minimum composite score over an academic course, involving diﬀerent subject matters and skills.9 Given our interest in self-chosen
goals, we oﬀer incentives in a speciﬁc subject and over a limited time horizon, trying to facilitate students’ thinking over their goals.
With this objective in mind, we choose to incentivize the Introductory Microeconomics ﬁnal exam like in Leuven et al. (2011). Similar
to us, Levitt et al. (2011) incentivized a speciﬁc task (a standardized test), focusing on short-term eﬀort in achievement.
Third, we address the issue of target students, diﬀerentiating (a) primary/middle education and higher education students, (b)
higher and low ability students and (c) voluntary and non-voluntary students.10 Regarding (a), we are interested in higher education
students given that monetary incentives’ provision to under-age subjects can be a problematic issue. This is so given that when
participants are minors, experimentalists have to consider the ways children of diﬀerent ages view the value of a payment, and to
ensure that the amount and method are age-appropriate, and it does not present undue inﬂuence. With respect to (b), students are
classiﬁed based on their scores in diﬀerent tasks, which can be more or less related to the incentivized performance. Using scores in
two programs of mathematics in Dutch secondary education, Leuven et al. (2010) sorted students in high and low ability types. These
authors found that high-ability students had higher pass rates and collected signiﬁcantly more credit points whenever they were
assigned to (larger) reward groups. In contrast, low-ability students appeared to achieve less when they were assigned to the large
reward group. These negative eﬀects for less-able students were consistent with the work by Camerer and Hogarth (1999), who found
that the performance threshold could result in a binding participation constraint at the bottom of the ability distribution, resulting in
zero incentive eﬀects for low-ability students. In the same line and following a tournament rule to the 30 best performing students, De
Paola et al. (2012) obtained that ﬁnancial rewards increased high ability (above the median high school grade) students’ performance
while the eﬀect was null for low ability participants. Looking for the closest relationship between students’ academic background and
their incentivized task, we classify them in two types: returning students (if they had a failed background in Introductory Micro-
economics) and new students (if they had not). Contrary to the aforementioned literature, where the eﬀect of incentives is low or null
for low ability students, we obtain that incentives are eﬀective, increasing returning students’ academic performance. Regarding (c),
we randomly assign students to a treatment group (where incentives are oﬀered) or to a control group (where no incentives are
oﬀered once they have explicitly declared their will to participate). Our design, requiring voluntary participation, ensures that
subjects are really interested in being included in the experiment. In the terminology we use below, only subjects interested in the
oﬀered incentive will be considered participants. In the vast majority of the literature, experiments included as participants subjects
who did not explicitly declare any interest in the oﬀered incentive. Exceptions are Leuven et al. (2011), where students had to select
themselves into diﬀerent tournaments, Jackson (2010), Cha and Patel (2010), Scott-Clayton (2011) and Patel and Rudd (2012),
where students had to enroll in the corresponding state program, and De Paola et al. (2012), where students were asked to ﬁll a
participation form.11
Lastly, we deal with another signiﬁcant issue: time intervals. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the waiting time between the call and the
starting of the task, and the waiting time between the accomplishment of the task and the reception of incentives (rewards). On one
hand, most of the studies that reward incentives based on test performance announced the incentives well in advance of the test. On
the other, studies that announced incentives immediately before the test distributed the payoﬀs with an appreciable delay. The
evidence on such delayed rewards is mixed. In this sense, O’Neil et al. (1995) and O’Neil (1997) found that students’ eﬀort may be
increased by ﬁnancial rewards oﬀered at the time of the test. In the same vein, Levitt et al. (2011) found that all motivating power of
the incentives vanished when rewards were handed out with a delay. Therefore, shortening as much as possible both time intervals is
a recommendable strategy in order to obtain a signiﬁcant impact on student performance.12 In our case, both waiting times are
6 Using diﬀerent award schemes for primary and middle school students, Fryer (2011) found that paying for performance on standardized tests had little or no eﬀect
on the outcomes for which students received ﬁnancial incentives.
7 Many colleges and universities oﬀer ﬁnancial incentives in the form of merit scholarships. However, these incentives are of a diﬀerent nature to freely disposable
money. See, for example, papers by Henry et al. (2004), Cornwell et al. (2005), Angrist and Lavy (2009), Angrist et al. (2009), Scott-Clayton (2011), Sjoquist and
Winters (2012) and Castleman et al. (2014).
8 The vast majority of the papers use only one payment mechanism, generally the piece-rate system.
9 See, for example, papers by Fryer (2011), Bettinger (2012), Angrist et al. (2014), Barrow et al. (2016) and Castleman et al. (2014).
10 See Lavecchia et al. (2014) for a literature classiﬁcation according to education level.
11 In our paper, incentive eﬀects are disentangled from sorting eﬀects by means of an experimental design that allows us to obtain individual data on academic
performance with and without incentives in the same Introductory Microeconomic course. Contrary to Leuven et al. (2011), we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in performance
between students can be attributed entirely to incentive eﬀects.
12 Braun et al. (2011) is an example of good results in which the incentive was announced immediately before the test and the reward was distributed immediately
after the test.
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reduced to a minimum: incentives are oﬀered after the midterm exam, allowing a maximum one month time span between the
announcement of the experiment and the day of the ﬁnal exam (similar to Leuven et al., 2011).13 After the publication of the
deﬁnitive grades (two weeks after the exam), participants are immediately paid in cash.
Summing-up, our experimental design aims to maximize the eﬃcacy of monetary incentives on academic performance in a
speciﬁc task, oﬀering monetary incentives (according to a piece-rate system or a competitive ranking) on self-chosen goals to vo-
lunteer higher education students. Based on this design strategy, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 ((H1)). Monetary incentives based on self-chosen academic goals should increase the academic performance obtained
by both new and returning students.
Hypothesis 2 ((H2)). A piece-rate payment mechanism should be more eﬀective upgrading average academic performance of all
participants than a rank-order tournament system. Contrary to piece-rate payment schemes, under rank-order tournaments students’
payoﬀs are discontinuous in the level of exerted eﬀort. This is so given that a marginal unit of eﬀort increases the expected student
payoﬀ by increasing the probability to win, but it does not necessarily generate a higher payoﬀ. This feature can produce complicated
behavioral eﬀects aﬀecting its eﬀectiveness.
Our results conﬁrm H1 and reject H2 using a clean experimental design where confounding factors such as gender, degree,
professor and university entrance grades are controlled.
Onwards, the structure of the paper is organized as follows: ﬁrst, we present the design of the implemented experiment; after that,
we analyze the empirical evidence collected; and lastly, we present our conclusions.
4. Experimental design
We conducted a randomized ﬁeld experiment aiming to improve academic performance in an introductory course of
Microeconomics through monetary incentives oﬀered on the basis of self-chosen goals.
New and returning students enrolled in the 2017/2018 course of Introductory Microeconomics at the University Jaume I were
oﬀered the possibility of taking part in a monetary incentive program asking them through an invitation call about their willingness
to participate. We opened our call once students had been midterm examined.14 In the call they were informed that students re-
sponding aﬃrmatively would be randomly assigned15 to one of three groups: a control group, Treatment 1 (T1), or two alternative
treatment groups: Treatment 2 (T2) and Treatment 3 (T3). In T1 participants would not be monetarily incentivized. Alternatively,
participants assigned to T2 would be paid according to their absolute (piece-rate) academic performance. Lastly, in T3 a rank-order
tournament would be used as payment mechanism to reward participants.16 Additionally, we notiﬁed that participants would receive
information about their corresponding group before they were invited to choose a goal for their ﬁnal exam grade. This design discards
possible willingness eﬀects given that, both the treatment groups and the control group are integrated only by students declaring
their willingness to participate in the program. Moreover, students not responding our call were included in Treatment 0 (T0) in order
to compare non-participants’midterm grades with the corresponding ones obtained by participants. In doing so, we can check for the
actual existence of a (potential) willingness eﬀect in our sample.
Like in Clark et al. (2016), we allowed participants to bet17 according to their personal goal (as opposed to goals set by a
professor).18 In this way, the goal was tailored to each student’s degree of self-control and ambition. In order to do so, we used an
experimental design strategy similar to Jackson (2010), opening a call named “Bet for your grade and win”, right after students had
been informed about their grades in a midterm exam.19 This within-subject strategy aims to collect individual grades with and
without incentives for the same subject. Among 496 students enrolled in Introductory Microeconomics (406 new students and 90
returning students), 177 of them (111 new students and 66 returning students) attended the call to participate in this experiment.
These rates of acceptation contrast with De Paola et al. (2012) where about 90% of students assigned to treated groups decided to
participate in the experiment.
Table 1 lists the summary of the treatments discussed above.
In the experiment, the purpose of bettors was to maximize their monetary reward (R). Subjects were informed that their R would
depend on their bet (B), the grade (G) they obtained in the Introductory Microeconomics ﬁnal exam, and, only for returning students,
the average grade (AG) in the same subject-matter ﬁnal exams in previous semesters, according to the following function:
13 Students were allowed to bet until the day before the ﬁnal exam.
14 Subjects had not been informed about any incentive program before the midterm exam.
15 We randomize the treatments within each type (new and returning) of student.
16 Rank-order tournaments as analyzed in Lazear and Rosen (2009) are characterized by the evaluation of individual performance relative to the performance of
competitors. Regarding this issue van Dijk et al. (2001) ﬁnd that tournaments lead to a higher eﬀort on average but more variable compared to the other payment
schemes.
17 Note that we use the meaning of “bet” as a guess or opinion, given that our participants do not risk their own money.
18 Unlike van Lent and Souverijn (2016), where a mentor-student meeting was used to induce students to set a course-speciﬁc grade goal, we choose to implement a
website to gather students’ bets in order to avoid any kind of bias in their outcome expectations.
19 In order to participate in the experiment, subjects were asked to register on a betting system based on PHP+MySQL through our lab’s (LEE) website. Once
registered they were randomly assigned to the control or the treatment groups. Then, all students could bet on the highest grade they thought they could get.
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Students were rewarded with R euros only if G was higher than or equal to B.20
Therefore, in T2 all students whose grade was higher than or equal to their bet (successful bettors) earned R euros.21 Alter-
natively, in T3 we implemented two rank-order identical tournaments, one for the new students and another one for returning
students, oﬀering the aforementioned rewards only for the top three students in each tournament.22 Thus, new and returning students
compete separately in two independent tournaments for prizes. In the experiment instructions, participants23 were informed that the
two rankings would be published soon after the notiﬁcation of the ﬁnal exam actual grades, and prizes would be delivered to
participants immediately after that.24
Our experimental design allows us: (a) to make between-subjects comparisons between grades obtained in the midterm exam by
non-participants (T0) and participants (T1+T2+T3) in order to test for willingness eﬀects, (b) to make between-subjects com-
parisons between grades obtained in the ﬁnal exam by T1 students and T2/T3 students and (c) to analyze the factors driving the
incentivized grades and bets, controlling for potential confounding factors, such as gender, degree, professor and the University
Entrance Grade (UEG).
5. Data analysis
5.1. Sample self-selection: a potential willingness eﬀect
Because of our design requires students’ willingness to participate in the program in both the control group and the treatments
group, potential self-selection problems are ruled out. In spite of this, it can be interesting to analyze the real existence of this
potential eﬀect comparing grades obtained in the midterm exam between students who are willing and who are not willing to
participate in the program.
Table 2 shows that the average grades obtained in the midterm exam by new/returning students declaring their willingness to
participate in the program are higher than non-participants. However, these diﬀerences are statistical signiﬁcant in median only for
new students.25 In consequence, requiring voluntary participation in the control group avoids an actual self-selection problem in our
sample of new students.
Additionally, as double-check tool for rule out self-selection problems, we compare grades obtained by students in the midterm
exam between our treatment groups (T2/T3) and the control group (T1) ﬁnding no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in any case.26
5.2. Descriptive statistics
This section presents descriptive statistics of students’ bets and grades corresponding to the ﬁnal exam in the Introductory
Microeconomics course.
5.2.1. Bets
Fig. 1 shows new and returning students’ bets averages. For both, new and returning students, we observe that the bets’ average is
slightly higher in T3 compared to T2.27 Moreover, the bets’ averages obtained by new students are higher than the ones obtained by
Table 1
Summary of treatments. ME: Midterm exam; FE: Final Exam.
Treatments Number of subjects Treatment variables
New Returning Willingness to participate Incentive ME/FE Payment Mechanism
T0 295 24 No No/No –
T1 41 19 Yes No/No –
T2 31 22 Yes No/Yes Piece-rate
T3 39 25 Yes No/Yes Tournament
20 For new students R= B2 given that AG=0.
21 Note that, if G≥ B, the reward was the same for all students with identical bets, independently of the obtained grade. Additionally, students were only paid if
their ﬁnal grade was at least 5 out of 10.
22 According to Vandegrift et al. (2007), a tournament in which second and third-place performers also receive a payment should induce lower performance than a
winner-take-all tournament.
23 New and returning students were informed about the number of participants included in their group before they were allowed to bet.
24 The instructions are available upon request.
25 Mann-Whitney test p-values for new (returning) students: 0.013 (0.291).
26 Using a t- (Mann-Whitney) test we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between T1 and T2, and T1 and T3, for both new (returning) students, p-values: 0.771 and 0.760
(0.236 and 0.398) respectively.
27 Using a Mann-Whitney test we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between T2 and T3 bets for both new (p-value: 0.935) and returning students (p-value: 0.270)
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returning students.
In view of the fact that only the top three students were monetary rewarded in T3, bettors in this treatment could be compelled to
overestimate their goals, resulting in higher bets.
5.2.2. Grades
For returning students, we deﬁne “grade improvement” as the students’ ﬁnal exam grade in the semester in which the incentive
program was implemented minus the average of ﬁnal exam grades in previous semesters.
Fig. 2 displays descriptive statistics corresponding to new students’ grades and returning students’ grade improvements after our
call. We observe that the average of grades obtained by T2 (T3) new students is 1.36 (1.28) points higher than the average of grades
obtained by T1 students. A similar pattern is observed for returning students given that the diﬀerence between T2 (T3) and T1
average of incentivized improvement grades is 1.23 (1.43). Graphically, we can see these aforementioned diﬀerences in grades and
grade improvements between the control group and the treatment group students for new and returning students respectively are
noticeable.
Additionally, for new students in the two treatment groups, we observe that the standard deviation of incentivized grades is
higher than the one corresponding to T1. Nevertheless, for returning students we observe the opposite eﬀect.
Comparing the treatment groups, T2 and T3, we observe no noticeable diﬀerences between grades under the two incentive
systems (piece-rate and rank-order tournament) for both new and returning students.
5.3. Statistical tests
5.3.1. Incentive eﬀects
In this subsection, we analyze the eﬀect of monetary incentives on new and returning students’ ﬁnal exam grades. Since all
datasets are normally distributed for a 95% level of conﬁdence, parametric tests are used in order to compare incentivized grades: (a)
a t-test comparing means from the two populations, (b) a Levene test comparing variances and (c) a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
comparing distributions.
5.3.1.1. New students. Distributions of grades obtained in the ﬁnal exam by students in T1, T2 and T3 are presented in Fig. 3. For
Table 2
Averages and standard deviations (included between parentheses) corresponding to grades obtained in the midterm exam by new and returning students.
Students New Returning
Participants Yes No Yes No
4.35 3.59 4.28 3.78
(2.72) (2.58) (2.45) (2.28)
Fig. 1. Bets’ average (standard deviations included between parentheses).
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grades higher than ﬁve, the percentage of treatment group students is higher than the controls’ percentage. Particularly, only
incentivized students reach the highest grades. Additionally, for a 90% level of conﬁdence, grades obtained by new students in T2 can
be considered not normally distributed.28 For this reason, we implement additional non-parametric tests in order to conﬁrm our
results.
For both treatments, T2 and T3, from (a) we ﬁnd that the median of grades obtained by incentivized groups is signiﬁcantly higher
than the median of grades obtained by students in our control group.29 In addition, we obtain from b) that the variance of T2/T3
grades is signiﬁcantly higher than the variance of T1 grades,30 while from (c) we ﬁnd that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the distributions of grades obtained by T2/T3 students and the corresponding distribution for T1 students.31
Result 1: For both payment schemes, piece-rate and rank-order tournament, monetary incentives based on self-chosen goals are
Fig. 2. Averages and standard deviations (included between parentheses) corresponding to grades (new students) and grade improvements (returning students).
Fig. 3. Distribution of grades obtained in the ﬁnal exam by new students in T1, T2 and T3.
28 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-values for T1, T2 and T3 are 0.084, 0.119 and 0.115.
29 T-test p-values: 0.027 for T2 and 0.012 for T3. Additionally, Mann-Whitney test p-values are 0.096 for T2 and 0.042 for T3.
30 Levene test p-values: 0.000 for T2 and 0.002 for T3.
31 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-values: 0.104 for T2 and 0.079 for T3.
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eﬀective to increase grades obtained by voluntary new students
5.3.2. Returning students
Fig. 4 presents distributions of improvement grades obtained in the ﬁnal exam by returning students in T1, T2 and T3. In this
ﬁgure, we can observe that, with the exception of improvement grades between 4 and 4.99, for any positive grade improvement the
percentage of controls is lower than the percentage of incentivized students.
In both treatments, from (a) we ﬁnd that mean of grade improvements in T2/T3 is signiﬁcantly higher than the mean of grade
improvements obtained by non-incentivized students.32 Moreover, from (b) we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the variances of
grade improvements only comparing T1 and T3,33 while from c) signiﬁcant diﬀerences are obtained between distributions of in-
centivized and control students.34
Result 2: Both relative and absolute academic monetary incentives based on self-chosen goals are eﬀective to increase grade
improvements of returning voluntary students.
Results 1 and 2 conﬁrm our H1. However, result 2 contrasts with Grove and Wasserman (2006) that using a natural experiment
concluded that grade incentives to practice economics throughout the semester boosted the average freshman exam performance, but
not that of academically above- or below- average students, or of any other category of students.
5.3.3. The eﬀects of diﬀerent payment mechanisms
In this section, we test H2 comparing the treatments groups (T2 and T3) in order to analyze the eﬀect of the two payment
mechanisms implemented for both new and returning students. Contrary to our H2, we ﬁnd that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between medians, variances and distributions of (improvement) grades obtained by new (returning) students in T2 and the corre-
sponding ones in T3.35
In accordance with the ﬁndings obtained by van Dijk et al. (2001), that workers with relatively low ability do not seem to realize
that they have little chance of winning a rank-order tournament, we obtain that subjects do not bet diﬀerently owing to the payment
system. Namely, diﬀerences in the median/distribution of bets are not statistically signiﬁcant between treatments.36
Result 3: Incentives based on relative academic performance are equally eﬀective than those based on absolute performance to
increase the average of students’ grades
5.4. Regression analysis
5.4.1. Determinants of bets
In this subsection, we estimate diﬀerent models to shed light on the determinants of the bets.
The models include as covariates: (1) the fact of being assigned randomly to T1 (where students are paid according to a piece rate)
or to T2 (where a tournament is used to reward students), (2) the non-incentivized (midterm) grades collected before the starting of
the incentives’ program, (3) the fact of being a returning student, (4) the degree they are enrolled in,37 (5) professor38 and (6) the
UEG.
Fig. 4. Distribution of grade improvements obtained by returning students in T1, T2 and T3.
32 T-test p-values: 0.080 for T2 and 0.027 for T3.
33 Levene test p-values: 0.708 for T2 and 0.088 for T3.
34 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-values: 0.066 for T2 and 0.011 for T3.
35 For new (returning) students, t, Levene and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests p-values are 0.903 (0.716), 0.458 (0.092) and 0.982 (0.357) respectively.
36 Mann-Whitney test p-value is 0.761 and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test p-value is 0.249.
37 The subject Introductory Microeconomics is shared by students of 4 diﬀerent degrees: Management, Economics, double degree of Economics and Law and
Accounting.
38 Each professor teaches one of the 6 class groups from A to F.
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The last OLS model presented (Model 7) in Table 3 controls for all the potential confounding factors. The results obtained in this
analysis are quite conclusive. The midterm exam grades do not inﬂuence subjects’ bets. Otherwise, other factors such as treatment
group, the fact of being returning, gender, degree and class group aﬀect signiﬁcantly the self-chosen goals of students. Particularly,
those who have failed the subject previously choose less demanding goals than new students. Furthermore, given that in the tour-
nament mechanism (T3) only the top three students are rewarded, their bets are higher than the ones of those betting under a piece
rate mechanism (T2). In the explanation of bets, gender plays a role, pointing that women are more conservative in terms of bets than
men are. In addition, students enrolled in the double degree bet signiﬁcantly higher than those enrolled in accounting do. A possible
explanation may rest on the fact that they are, theoretically, cleverer given that the cut-oﬀ mark for entering in this degree is higher.
Furthermore, one class group is statistically signiﬁcant respect to class group C. We use class group C as a reference category because
the professor is one of the experimentalists. The results help us to avoid potential critics about the problem of having a professor in
the subject who has design the experiment given that only the bets ﬁxed by students belonging to the class group F are signiﬁcantly
higher. The remaining class groups bet in a similar way. Finally, the UEG does not aﬀect students’ self-chosen goals.
5.4.2. Determinants of the incentivized grades
Now, we estimate diﬀerent OLS models to shed light on the key determinants of the incentives’ program eﬀects on students’
incentivized grades. This analysis not only supports our previous results based on descriptive analysis, but also controls for the
potential inﬂuences of confounding factors. In Table 4 we include the same covariates as before.
As long as more covariates are included in the models the explanation power increases and, step-by-step the eﬀect of each
explanatory variable can be analyzed in a detailed way. The ﬁrst result obtained is the power of the incentives provided increasing
grades. Speciﬁcally, the tournament is more powerful increasing grades than the piece rate, although both of them reach their main
purpose. The career path of the student in the same subject (non-incentivized grade) as a predictor of their grade is veriﬁed. Another
determinant explaining incentivized grades is the fact of being a returning student in the subject: given that, it is not the ﬁrst time
they face the subject’s concepts, their grade increases in average more than the one obtained by subjects enrolled in the subject the
ﬁrst time. Gender does not inﬂuence the grades under incentives. Additionally, another determinant is the degree they are enrolled
in, pointing that those coursing the double degree in economics and law obtained signiﬁcantly higher grades than those enrolled in
Table 3
Models explaining bets.
Bet Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Non-incentivized grade 0.0906** 0.0908** 0.0725* 0.0842** 0.0638 0.0450 0.0533
(0.0424) (0.0408) (0.0402) (0.0397) (0.0394) (0.0437) (0.0436)
Returning −0.722*** −0.984*** −0.811*** −0.647** −0.618** −0.824**
(0.254) (0.262) (0.268) (0.268) (0.301) (0.325)
T2 0.807** 0.804** 0.628* 0.635* 0.621*
(0.331) (0.324) (0.326) (0.325) (0.322)
T3 0.907*** 0.914*** 0.883*** 0.926*** 0.925***
(0.321) (0.314) (0.307) (0.320) (0.317)
Gender 0.524** 0.582** 0.560** 0.491*
(0.238) (0.245) (0.262) (0.264)
Management −0.173 −0.237 −0.264
(0.279) (0.282) (0.280)
Economics −0.214 −0.503 −0.451
(0.304) (0.330) (0.329)
Economics+ Law 1.219** 1.290** 1.831***
(0.492) (0.534) (0.628)
Class group A −0.0331 0.207
(0.329) (0.359)
Class group B −0.0858 −0.0377
(0.405) (0.402)
Class group D 0.233 0.268
(0.487) (0.483)
Class group E 0.122 0.151
(0.386) (0.383)
Class group F 1.090** 1.000**
(0.478) (0.477)
UEG −0.147
(0.0923)
Constant 5.882*** 6.104*** 5.602*** 5.185*** 5.331*** 5.398*** 6.575***
(0.248) (0.251) (0.298) (0.348) (0.415) (0.419) (0.847)
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
R-squared 0.047 0.125 0.201 0.243 0.314 0.369 0.389
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
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accounting. The last factors explaining the grades obtained in the incentivized scenario are the class groups they belong to or in other
words, the professor. As we have explained previously we use class group C as a reference category because the professor is one of the
experimentalists. The grades obtained by his students are in the mean, ﬁnding groups with signiﬁcantly more and fewer points in the
incentivized grades analyzed thus, our results are not inﬂuenced by this fact. Lastly, the UEG has not any eﬀect in the incentivized
grades obtained by the students.
The previous results based on descriptive analysis are corroborated by means of these regressions making our results about the
role of the incentives’ program designed more convincing.
Result 5: Controlling for potential confounding factors both payment mechanisms are eﬀective increasing grades of new and
returning students. Furthermore, although grades obtained in the midterm exam do not aﬀect students’ self-chosen goals, they do
explain their ﬁnal exam grades.
6. Conclusions
Our paper is the ﬁrst study that introduces self-chosen academic goals in an incentive-compatible ﬁeld experiment including two
alternative payment mechanisms. We have analyzed the eﬀectiveness of monetary incentives based on absolute and relative aca-
demic performance using a piece-rate and a rank-order tournament system respectively. New and returning students in Introductory
Microeconomics at the University Jaume I were oﬀered the possibility to participate in the incentives program explaining them
beforehand the diﬀerent groups they could be assigned to. Those accepting and showing explicitly their will to participate were
randomly assigned to a control (where no incentives were oﬀered) or to two alternative treatment groups (where incentives were
oﬀered) and then, they were asked to bet on their own ﬁnal exam grade. Our experimental design aims to maximize the eﬃciency of
monetary incentives based on self-chosen goals, choosing to a speciﬁc task and a limited time horizon, and providing the incentives
with immediacy.
Our results suggest that non-incentivized grades obtained in the midterm exam do not inﬂuence students’ self-chosen goals, but
they explain the incentivized grades obtained in the ﬁnal exam.
Controlling for potential confounding factors as gender, degree, professor and the UEG, we ﬁnd that incentives based on a
Table 4
Models explaining incentivized grades.
Incentivized grade Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
T2 1.354*** 1.252*** 1.146** 1.146** 0.928** 0.891** 0.863**
(0.431) (0.440) (0.442) (0.443) (0.406) (0.365) (0.372)
T3 1.357*** 1.395*** 1.303*** 1.303*** 1.334*** 1.141*** 1.115***
(0.414) (0.419) (0.420) (0.421) (0.384) (0.348) (0.354)
Non-incentivized grade 0.196*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.136** 0.257*** 0.262***
(0.0669) (0.0665) (0.0668) (0.0620) (0.0606) (0.0627)
Returning 0.626* 0.626* 1.065*** 0.868** 0.839**
(0.367) (0.377) (0.353) (0.341) (0.370)
Gender 0.00143 0.221 −0.240 −0.253
(0.360) (0.341) (0.314) (0.319)
Management −0.394 −0.156 −0.153
(0.416) (0.380) (0.385)
Economics −0.123 0.135 0.130
(0.463) (0.428) (0.432)
Economics+ Law 3.952*** 3.849*** 3.983***
(0.773) (0.740) (0.828)
Class group A 0.0634 0.123
(0.445) (0.487)
Class group B 2.177*** 2.187***
(0.470) (0.475)
Class group D −0.136 −0.142
(0.553) (0.558)
Class group D −1.430*** −1.389**
(0.525) (0.540)
Class group F −0.368 −0.393
(0.573) (0.580)
UEG −0.0438
(0.123)
Constant 2.955*** 2.181*** 1.999*** 1.998*** 2.043*** 1.600*** 1.952*
(0.298) (0.405) (0.416) (0.479) (0.559) (0.531) (1.088)
Observations 177 158 158 158 158 158 156
R-squared 0.073 0.134 0.150 0.150 0.310 0.472 0.469
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
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tournament mechanism are as eﬀective as those based a piece-rate scheme to increase grades of new and returning students.
Although this paper highlights the importance of providing incentives to students in order to increase their academic perfor-
mance, policymakers could be worried by the ﬁnancial resources needed to guarantee its eﬀectiveness. Our results show that a (low-
cost) rank-order tournament payment mechanism based on self-chosen goals can be as eﬀective as a (resource intensive) piece-rate
mechanism. Consequently, government policies should be able to support the development of eﬀective incentive programs, allowing
students to compete for rewards based on their self-chosen goals.
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